Yes, but this explanation of the daydreamy, delusional aspect of common experience assumes the reality of the brain and the human body. To explain how the delusion is formed, you have to assume the nondelusion of some of our experience. So that's a contradiction.

I think it makes more sense to think of what empiricists call the secondary qualities of experience (colours, sounds, tastes, etc) as belonging to mental models that approximate the complexified features of external objects and patterns.

So it's not that the greenness of a leaf is entirely unreal. It's that the objective, atomic interactions build up to produce the system roughly of a brain transducing light bouncing off the objective reality of a leaf that's made up of many chemically interacting cells (and molecules), resulting in the impression of greenness. That greenness isn't an arbitrary, gratuitous mental imposition, which is to say it's not best thought of as a delusion. It's more like an illusion or a potentially misleading simplification or caricature.

As I said, though, I have a sneaking suspicion that Buddhists are committed to using the stronger language to motivate the Buddhist reformation of egoism. It could be a case of the moral ends justifying the semantic means.