Why can't a compatibilist say that consciousness is one of the internal causes involved in making autonomous decisions? I'm not an eliminativist about consciousness. And compatibilist freedom is "weak" compared to what, the religious fantasy that we have supernatural abilities to counteract nature, like an anti-gravity engine?
I'd also say our autonomous powers needn't be internal since they include, by extension, culture and our artifacts with which we identify. When we drive a car, for instance, the car becomes part of our body. Using this vehicle becomes second nature because of an imaginative act of personal identification.
Similarly, we can identify with institutions or worldviews. For instance, my body of writing is my brainchild. I produce that writing or worldview, but the latter in turn constrains me in a relatively unnatural way. That is, a worldview is a home or weapon that helps us oppose nature--not in a supernatural way but in one that emerges naturally, according to biology, psychology, sociology, and the like.
