Well, that's what pragmatism is liable to do, mix ethics with epistemology, so that's more of a description than an objection. The question is whether "What is truth?" can be answered without appealing to practices and without resorting to magic or nonsense.
I haven't read Husserl much. I understand he's difficult to read. But I talk about similar problems in different terms. He brings a kind of positivism to bear, with his talk of philosophy as a science. I take the Kantian point about the inevitability of subjectivity in knowledge, in pragmatic, existential, and cosmicist directions. So I like how Husserl ponders the ultimate role of consciousness in the universe, but I don't know if the institution of science has much to do with it. I have a more limited view of science as systematic objectification, so that science ends up re-enchanting nature (by discovering the zombie-like bruteness of physical relations) and leading ironically to pantheism.
I find that irony is a great sign of higher truth. The more we emerge in discourse as absurd playthings, the closer we are to our existential predicament.
As for the subjectivity of knowledge, you might want to have a look at my recent article on understanding (top link). I list some of my other pragmatic epistemological articles below, too.
