The idea behind that quoted sentence and the article's first section is that knowledge can be the bearer of bad news, such as that reality at large is amoral. That means all our values are estranged oddities.

You point out that we can still find subjective meaning in an objective world by using the value-neutral facts to our advantage, by avoiding the harmful (and therefore "bad") ones and going after the advantageous ones. That's what I say in the very next paragraph, in the second one in that first section. The investigation proceeds from there.

What I mean to get at is the strangeness of "loving" knowledge, not just deeming it useful, when it turns out that philosophy is so subversive. The kind of "knowledge" we'd prefer to have and that most people actually cherish is the conventional wisdom that keeps us in the Matrix, as it were, namely the religious dogmas, comforting stereotypes, and self-indulgent, anthropocentric myths that sustain our happiness. What we actually love is our opinions, not real knowledge. If scientific and philosophical knowledge upsets all of that, why think that knowledge is still lovable? Why define "philosophy" in that way?

The answer in the platonic tradition is that those philosophers were dualists and quasi-Gnostics.

Then the article moves into the next section.