That’s not quite it. I think of my epistemology as neo-Kantian, in that I take a pragmatic view of Kant. The transcendental conditions of knowledge can be social, and they needn’t be necessary. (This could be combined with something like Spengler’s view of cultural cycles and relativism.)
Hume’s “fork” distinguished between empirical and analytic knowledge, the latter being supposedly trivial relations between concepts, which would include mathematics. I’m not an empiricist since empiricism is too close to scientism. My view of math is pragmatic rather than Platonic (although I’m open to changing my mind on this since I’m hardly an expert in math).
My point isn’t that the forms of math are synthetic a priori or are part of the necessary structure of human mentality. Again, culture, psychedelics, and the like can rewire the brain and affect our presuppositions. Instead, I take a fictionalist view of math (links below). Mathematical abstractions are literally false (because they’re extreme simplifications), but they’re sometimes useful, rather like fictional narratives such as myths. This raises the question of what literal truth is supposed to be, which would take me to my critique of so-called objective truth.
But the issue in this article isn’t math as much as the status of “laws of nature.” I’m saying that that figure of speech is based on outdated deism, and it has the harmful side effect of de-emphasizing the anomalousness of our ability to imagine improvements on empirical facts.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fictionalism
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/
