That's an advanced, rather Kantian way of looking at it, and I'm inclined to agree. But Hume's problem of induction may still entail that the impulse to see necessary connections between types of natural events isn't entirely subjective. Nature gets us in the habit of seeing this nomic necessity because natural regularities are indeed so reliable. Maybe they're reliable only here where we can see them, and nature behaves differently in other realms far beyond our ken. Either way, we're drawn to posit more than accidental or reliable relationships in nature, contrary to strict empiricists, because we induce necessary connections from that experience of reliability.

Hume's point was that that induction isn't entirely rational. But not all deviations from logic are necessarily bad. Some can be honourable or moral or somehow life-affirming. It seems to me the notion of "laws of nature" has persisted even in science because of the secular faith that nature isn't entirely monstrous. We need a natural order to guarantee the possibility that we can figure nature out to conquer its territory.