No, the classical economic discourse was more philosophical and historical than rigorously scientific. When a model is ambiguous, it's more philosophical than scientific, by definition. So you're saying the same thing but in different words.

The issue isn't whether economics satisfies necessary and sufficient conditions of science. Maybe Feyerabend was right and anything ought to go in science. But the method has to work (in being technological fruitful or in generating testable predictions) as opposed to being fraudulent.

You've provided examples of the equivocation in question with your comments here. You're hemming and hawing instead of stating the economists' consensus on how economies work. And economists equivocate on "happiness" and "self-interest," as I showed in my articles. You'd have to press economists to uncover their dubious philosophical presumptions, but how often does that happen? Who bothers to get past the hyper-mathematical camouflage? Thus the ruse persists.