No, the argument against miracles doesn’t assume atheism or the nature of natural laws. For Hume it assumes empiricism and common experience. Resurrection of the dead isn’t part of common, human experience, at least not in the modern period. In the ancient world, the experience was very different since spirits and miracles were felt to be everywhere. But after the Scientific Revolution established the concept of objective, natural regularities, miracles were pushed further and further away from common experience. Theism was no longer the default assumption in educated circles. Hume pressed the point by analyzing “miracle” from a modern perspective.

So yes, as I read it, the argument assumes that modernity has changed the default interpretation of common experience.

Again, the argument doesn’t assume naturalism, contrary to what you say in the article. The argument assumes empiricism and a modern reading of the common human experience that living things die and stay dead. God isn’t perceivable, so he’s not part of an empiricist reading of common experience. Also, modernity has dramatically reduced the initial probability of God’s existence, compared to what it was in the ancient world. Theism used to be the default even for educated people, but that’s not so anymore.

Obviously, if God exists, he can perform miracles, including resurrections. But smuggling that possibility into this response to Hume’s argument makes a mockery of probability and of Bayes’ Theorem. God would perform miracles, which are no part of a rational human assessment of probabilities. Miracles are inexplicable, by definition, so this veneer of rationality you’re putting on God’s miracles reminds me of the orthodox economist’s pseudoscientific resort to esoteric math in his or her models of economic “equilibrium.”