No, I don't disown the argument made in this article. The argument is so solid in its simplicity that it's practically self-evident. If monism entails that our sense experience is illusory, because really everything is one, and selfishness is based on confusion resulting for those illusions, why isn't selflessness just as clearly based on some such confusion? If monism undermines the bad things we do, why doesn't it just as easily undermine the good things we do? How to explain away selfishness and suffering, while preserving the merit of morality, compassion, and selflessness?
I was just saying that this particular presentation is stripped down rather than being long, detailed, and rigorous. I changed the opening Buddhism quotation, by the way. And I'm currently writing an article on Buddhism.
Davidson was a very technical, rigorous writer, but I was never a fan. I don't know that he got involved in fundamental cosmological questions. I also don't know what, if anything, Davidson said about morality. By saying there's only one world, he was likely affirming methodological naturalism, despite the fact that for him mental events require a different form of explanation. He says mental events are token identical to token physical events, but mental types and physical types are explained using different vocabularies and theories.
I'm not quite sure what you're getting at with your question. Are you asking whether some secular philosophers have a problem accounting for morality? I'd say sure they do have that problem. That's been clear at least since MacIntyre's "After Virtue," from the early 1980s. I face that problem head-on by trying to reconstruct morality from aesthetics, as in the articles below, for example.