I've written a number of articles on objectivity, and on the self-refutation of relativism or antirealism. I take a pragmatic view of knowledge. There is a difference between objectivity and subjectivity since we can detach more or less from our preferences, and imagine alternative scenarios, including what the world would be like if we weren't observing it. But there's no pure objective knowledge, or what Kant would call noumenal truth because for truth to be known and understood it must be represented, which means it must be packaged in concepts and linguistic symbols which function as simplifying maps or models.
As for the problem of the antirealist's performative contradiction, I'm happy to regard these broad philosophical statements of mine as at least partly fictive. Our core beliefs are largely mythic, in that they're stories we tell that we cherish for filling in so many gaps, as we attempt to construct a coherent worldview. Now, is it perfectly objective that those core beliefs are fictive? No, it's partly objective and partly subjective, like all other knowledge. This account of epistemology is based on empirical information (such as the history of how past so-called objective knowledge tends to be replaced by "improved" models), and on philosophical interpretation.
That's not to say I'm a solipsist who thinks worldviews are entirely subjective or that truth is relative just to culture or to perspective. There is an external world and a natural order, and we know it better with science than we knew it before the Scientific Revolution. Scientific institutions excel at objectifying the world. But even scientific objectivity is a form of humanization, as opposed to being neutral. Objectification is a strategy for empowering our species at nature's expense.
Here are links to some of my related articles.
