I can see how the article could give that impression. What's unclear in that particular article is the difference between objectivity and pure, absolute, naive objectivity. I sort of ran the two together so that in rejecting the latter, the reader might think I was rejecting the former or objectivity as such.
Again, what I meant to reject--and the target of this epistemological series as a whole--is objectivity in so far as it's naively conceived as being free of any trace of substantive subjectivity. So it's pure, anti-Kantian, possibly scientistic objectivity that I'm criticizing from a pragmatic (and an existential) perspective.
I agree that the pragmatist has work to do to distinguish pragmatism from a dubious kind of postmodern relativism. That was Richard Rorty's trouble. I agree with some aspects of postmodern philosophy, and I reject others. I accept some of the assumptions, but I'd reject some of the extreme inferences. I reject the lazy antirealistic justifications for turning philosophy into bad poetry, as though reason were a complete sham.
Below's an article against the Foucaultian basis for wokeness, for example, and see the second one for my account of the difference between modernism and postmodernism.
I think we're closer to being on the same page now. At any rate, I appreciate your holding my feet to the fire.
