Goals don't change the facts directly, although of course indirectly they can cause us to change them, as when we use our knowledge to make an impact on the world. Our concepts then act as blueprints for how the referent could potentially be changed, as we map out the thing's weak spots.

My point about objectivity was that we're less objective--as in neutral--than we often presuppose, given the pragmatic side of knowledge. Our concepts simplify and distort, and function as tools in our arsenal against the environment's indifference. We labour to make the environment prejudiced in our favour, as it were, by turning the wilderness into an artificial, intelligently designed domain.

So take any statement you'd want to say is "totally objective," such as "Williams won 23 singles major titles in tennis." That's supposed to be a statistic, and we can assume it's accurate. Alas, it's still nowhere close to being "totally objective" in the sense of being noumenal (rather than being indirectly about us and the limits of our cognitive powers) because that statement is about culture which is already fully artificial and intersubjective.

Saying there are objective facts pertaining to subjects or to products of subjectivity which are highly dependent on interpretation and perspective is oxymoronic. Tennis is a game or a fiction, like the story of Superman. Williams won her matches in part because of the rules of tennis and because of the judgment of the referee (or whatever that person is called in tennis), both of which are comparable to the author or inventor of Superman. What happens in such an artificial space is intersubjective (in a non-technical sense), not "totally objective."

Also, treating people or societies as objects entails a kind of partiality because it ignores the normative aspect of those subject matters, such as the rights of subjects. Such objectification might be unethical and thus, again, not neutral or "totally objective."

So tennis might be a special case. A better candidate would be a statement about nature. Are natural processes, systems, forces, or elements "objects"? Or is thinking of them as objects a form of neutrality? Not according to the pragmatic theory of knowledge I'm developing and defending. Every time we employ a concept that objectifies part of nature, we're involved in a mapping venture that's meant to put us in the driver's seat at nature's expense. Hence, the talk of pure or total objectivity is misleading. Knowledge isn't neutral. It's a tool used by people (and, of course, by animals to lesser effect) so they can flourish in their environment.

Again, with Superman you're ignoring the suspension of disbelief which is key to the inversion I posit. You posit another interesting inversion, which is fine. I think mine holds too. Superman begins, as you say, as a generative model or creation, dreamt up in the author's imagination. And Superman ends as something taken seriously by fanboys when they suspend their disbelief, pretend that Superman is real, and identify with the character to enjoy the fiction, release their emotions in an act of catharsis, and so on. The point is just that we take fictions more seriously than we should or than we would if we were autistic or unable to suspend our disbelief or to understand metaphors and the like. That's one side of an inversion.