By "dominant" I mean the one most influential in academia, business, and politics, the one most informed people associate with "game theory." So a dominant version would be culturally predominant.

Maybe the expanded versions wouldn't contradict an original, free-market-friendly core of game theory, but in that case they may contradict themselves. Indeed, that may be the problem with Ostrom's intended improvement on neoclassical game theory.

I note, for example, the article linked below, which one-ups Ostram with a _Critical_ Institutional Analysis Development framework and says, “From the outset, it should be recognised that the CIAD Framework dispenses with the game theoretic underpinning of Ostrom’s original IAD Framework. It therefore does not function as a tool to rigidly and reductively model decision making between individuals and groups in any definitive sense. Rather, it is a heuristic device that is suggestive of the questions, methods, dynamics, and relationships that facilitate a systematic and critical analysis of commons governance arrangements and the ways in which they change over time.”

So the CIAD goes further in the direction of flexibility, complexity, and real-worldliness, which means Ostrom’s model might be hampered precisely by its connection to game theory.

My impression from my recent readings on game theory is that the current state of play is largely about tinkering with the assumptions of game theory or of the rational choice paradigm in all sorts of ways to claim originality and special relevance to this or that problem. But that proliferation of models doesn’t mean any of them is particularly influential or important.

I'll likely write something on game theory in the near future...

https://www.thecommonsjournal.org/articles/10.18352/ijc.848/